Voluntary stopping of eating and drinking: is medical support ethically justified? by Jox, Ralf J et al.
This is an author produced version of Voluntary stopping of eating and drinking: is medical
support ethically justified?.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/122930/
Article:
Jox, Ralf J, Black, Isra orcid.org/0000-0001-5324-7988, Borasio, Gian Domenico et al. (1 
more author) (2017) Voluntary stopping of eating and drinking: is medical support ethically 
justified? BMC Medicine. 186. ISSN 1741-7015 
https://doi.org/10.1186/s12916-017-0950-1
promoting access to
White Rose research papers
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
DEBATE Open Access
Voluntary stopping of eating and drinking:
is medical support ethically justified?
Ralf J. Jox1,2*, Isra Black3,4, Gian Domenico Borasio5† and Johanna Anneser4†
Abstract
Background: Physician-assisted dying has been the subject of extensive discussion and legislative activity both in
Europe and North America. In this context, dying by voluntary stopping of eating and drinking (VSED) is often
proposed, and practiced, as an alternative method of self-determined dying, with medical support for VSED being
regarded as ethically and legally justified.
Argument: In our opinion, this view is flawed. First, we argue that VSED falls within the concept of suicide, albeit
with certain unique features (non-invasiveness, initial reversibility, resemblance to the natural dying process).
Second, we demonstrate, on the basis of paradigmatic clinical cases, that medically supported VSED is, at least in
some instances, tantamount to assisted suicide. This is especially the case if a patient’s choice of VSED depends on
the physician’s assurance to provide medical support.
Conclusion: Thus, for many jurisdictions worldwide, medically supported VSED may fall within the legal
prohibitions on suicide assistance. Physicians, lawmakers, and societies should discuss specific ways of regulating
medical support for VSED in order to provide clear guidance for both patients and healthcare professionals.
Please see related article: http://bmcmedicine.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12916-017-0951-0.
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Background
Severely ill patients with a short life expectancy may
have the desire to hasten death [1, 2]. Yet, euthanasia
and assisted suicide (together called ‘assisted dying’) are
legally prohibited in most countries, despite a recent
liberalization in some North American jurisdictions [3,
4]. Therefore, patients may resort to another option to
hasten their death – voluntary stopping of eating and
drinking (VSED) [5] – wherein patients deliberately and
voluntarily cease eating and/or drinking to bring about
their own death earlier than it would have occurred nat-
urally [6]. Studies show that the prevalence of VSED is
underestimated and may in fact be higher than that of
assisted suicide [7, 8]. Although the dying process is
generally reported to be peaceful, symptoms such as
thirst, pain, insomnia, anxiety, and delirium may require
medical support [7–9]. Professional medical organiza-
tions, while rejecting assisted dying, are increasingly ad-
vocating VSED (and medical support for VSED) without
giving a convincing ethical justification [10–12]. Most
Western jurisdictions seem to permit medical support
for VSED [13], even in jurisdictions where assisted dying
is prohibited by law, such as England and (partially)
Germany [14, 15]. However, a clear legal basis for medic-
ally supported VSED in statute or common law is often
lacking. Indeed, healthcare professionals often express
moral uncertainty as to whether medical support in the
context of VSED constitutes suicide assistance [16].
In this article, we first show that VSED should be cate-
gorized, on a purely descriptive basis, as a form of sui-
cide, albeit with particular characteristics that are not
shared by other forms. Second, we argue that supporting
patients who embark on VSED amounts to assistance in
suicide, at least in some instances, depending on the
kind of support and its relation to the patient’s intention.
Third, we conclude that, given the ethical equivalence of
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supported VSED and assisted suicide in some cases,
consistency is required in either allowing or restricting
both forms of aid in dying, depending on the normative
grounds for justification. This will have significant reper-
cussions for the ethics codes of the medical profession
as well as the law in several jurisdictions.
Argument
VSED and suicide
In colloquial language, suicide is understood as the act
of intentionally taking one’s own life [17]. Legal defini-
tions usually focus on the action, the intention, and the
decision-making capacity, as indicated by the definition
in Black’s Law Dictionary: “Suicide is the willful and vol-
untary act of a person who understands the physical na-
ture of the act, and intends by it to accomplish the result
of self-destruction” [18]. For the purpose of this article,
two elements in these definitions deserve scrutiny – the
action and the intention.
First, there has to be an action initiated by the patient
to cause the own death. Causation is understood in the
common legal way, comprising the necessary condition
(factual cause) and the sufficient condition (proximate
cause) for death to occur [19]. As such, suicide is differ-
ent from dying through withdrawing and withholding of
life-sustaining treatment. If, for example, artificial venti-
lation is stopped, this may be a necessary condition for
dying, but certainly not a sufficient condition, because
there has to be a respiratory pathology incompatible
with life that exerts its life-terminating effect once venti-
lation (having temporarily suspended this effect) has
been withdrawn.
The suicidal action that causes death does not have to
be a positive act; it may also be an omission. It is firmly
established in philosophy and law that both acts and
omissions can be employed intentionally to cause certain
states of affairs and can thus be regarded as forms of hu-
man agency [20]. While the most frequent forms of sui-
cide involve positive acts (e.g., gunshot, drug overdose,
hanging, and so on), there are also undisputed forms of
suicide by omission. Suicidal persons may seek life-
threatening situations (e.g., in traffic, water, skydiving)
and deliberately refrain from rescuing themselves, even
though they could easily do so. If we apply this concept
of suicide to VSED, it becomes evident that VSED is a
form of suicide by omission [21] – the person’s omission
of eating and drinking directly causes death. The cessa-
tion of the physiological influx of nutrients and water in
VSED parallels the cessation of the physiological influx
of oxygen that occurs in hanging or drowning. By con-
trast, when withdrawing artificial nutrition, hydration, or
ventilation, it is not a physiological everyday behavior
that is stopped but a medical treatment that technically
replaces a pathologically lost organ function.
The second element of suicide that becomes evident
in the abovementioned definitions is the intention to kill
oneself. This does not mean the intention to allow death
to occur naturally (as is the case in withdrawing life-
sustaining treatment), but the intention to hasten one’s
death. In VSED, the latter intention is clearly present.
First, this intention is usually verbalized by the patient
towards family members and healthcare professionals [7,
8]. Second, the intention to hasten death is impressively
demonstrated by the patient’s resolve to endure hunger
and thirst in order to reach this goal. Intention is also
the key element that distinguishes VSED as a form of
suicide from the alleviation of pain and symptoms with a
possible life-shortening effect (sometimes called ‘indirect
euthanasia’), which is not a form of suicide. In the latter,
patients accept the possibility of a life-shortening effect
of high-dosed drugs that are required to treat otherwise
uncontrollable symptoms in the dying phase. Irrespect-
ive of whether the shortening of life may be a contingent
side effect or a necessary means to symptom control, the
primary intention is always symptom relief and not
death.
VSED should therefore be considered as a form of sui-
cide, as there is both an intention to bring about death
and an omission that directly causes this effect. How-
ever, there are some characteristics that render VSED a
discrete form of suicide, distinct from other forms.
Firstly, in contrast to common forms of suicide (e.g., use
of firearms, hanging or suffocation, poisoning, falling)
[22], VSED is not characterized by an invasive or aggres-
sive act. Second, other methods of suicide typically result
in a relatively rapid death, occurring within seconds to
minutes, whereas even a complete cessation of eating
and drinking will only lead to death after at least several
days. As a consequence, the decision to kill oneself can
be reversed by resuming eating and drinking [23], at
least up to a certain point of no return when the patient
loses consciousness or when organ damage is too ad-
vanced to save the patient’s life. Moreover, this pro-
tracted course and the suffering that may accompany it
require more resolve from the patient than quicker
forms of suicide, thus providing a better safeguard
against impulsive suicidal behavior. Finally, phenom-
enologically, the dying phase in VSED resembles that
of the natural dying process, which also involves
some degree of dehydration. This may be a significant
advantage for patients as well as relatives and health-
care professionals and may partly explain the wide-
spread acceptance of this practice.
Whilst these three particular characteristics of VSED
do not change its status as a form of suicide, they may
have an impact on its ethical evaluation. Although sui-
cide is not generally seen as immoral behavior, some fea-
tures of the various forms of suicide may render them
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more or less ethically acceptable. For example, jumping
in front of a moving train and traumatizing the driver
may provoke moral reproach, whereas dying by VSED is
not directly harmful to others (although the stress
imparted on the relatives by the patient’s protracted
death may be significant).
VSED support and suicide assistance
The question now emerges as to whether the various
kinds of support that patients receive in the context of
VSED equal to assistance in suicide. In those regions
where assisted suicide is, under certain conditions, law-
ful (e.g., in Switzerland, Oregon, and Washington State),
a healthcare professional, family member, or right-to-die
association organizes and provides a lethal drug for the
patient to swallow or, in the case of swallowing difficul-
ties, an infusion that the patient can deliberately initiate.
Two elements of assistance in suicide are critical for our
argumentation. First, the assistance is instrumental for
death to occur, meaning that, without the assistance, the
suicide would not (or could not) occur. Second, the
assisting person knows and at least partially shares the
patient’s intention to induce death. These two elements
are critical when evaluating the medical support that pa-
tients can receive in the context of VSED. Four paradig-
matic types of scenarios can thus be distinguished:
A. The physician suggests VSED as a way of dying
when the patient was unaware of this possibility or
did not contemplate it (encouragement).
B. The physician promises to provide symptom relief or
any other kind of support after stopping eating and
drinking and the patient would choose this way of
dying only because of having received this promise
beforehand (promise).
C. The patient has already stopped eating and drinking,
but would resume oral intake and stop the suicidal
process due to suffering if symptom relief or other
kinds of support were not provided (support to
continue).
D. The patient has stopped eating and drinking and is
in need of symptom relief (e.g., because of pain or
delirium) or other kinds of medical support but will
continue refraining from eating and drinking
irrespective of whether this support is provided or
not (decision-unrelated support).
Ethically, scenarios A–C differ significantly from scenario
D (Fig. 1). In the first three cases, physician support is in-
strumental to suicide, i.e., support is a necessary condition
without which suicide would not occur. It is of secondary
importance whether the condition is objectively necessary
for suicide to occur, as in scenario A, or subjectively neces-
sary (from a patient’s perspective), as in scenarios B and C.
Moreover, in scenarios A–C, physicians know and at least
partially share a patient’s intention to hasten death by
VSED. In the encouragement case (scenario A), it is evident
that physicians would not address the possibility of VSED if
they were not prepared to endorse a patient’s intention to
choose this option. In scenarios B (promise) and C (support
to continue), physicians know that there is a real alternative
to providing medical support, namely not embarking on
VSED in scenario B or resuming eating and drinking in
scenario C. Thus, in scenarios A-C, physicians need to at
least partially share a patient’s intention in order to facili-
tate medically supported VSED. These two elements, in-
strumental agency and shared intention, imply physician
ethical co-responsibility for VSED.
However, in scenario D (decision-unrelated support),
physician support is not instrumental to suicide (Fig. 1),
Fig. 1 Medically supported voluntary stopping of eating and drinking (VSED): distinction of two ethically divergent types. Scenarios A–C and D
are described in the text. † signifies death
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because the patient would go ahead anyway. In addition,
physicians may well have the sole intention to ease patient
suffering and do not have to share the intention to hasten
death. Physicians know that, given a patient’s resolve to
continue with VSED in any case, there is no real alterna-
tive method to ease suffering other than to provide med-
ical support. In contrast to scenario C, this support will
not reinforce the decision for VSED and, as such, need
not condone a patient’s intention to hasten death.
Thus, there are realistic scenarios (A–C; encouragement,
promise, support to continue) in which medical support in
the context of VSED fulfils the two critical conditions of
suicide assistance, namely sharing the patient’s intention to
hasten death and the instrumental nature of the medical
act for the initiation or completion of the suicidal act. How-
ever, medical support that does not concern VSED but ra-
ther the withdrawing or withholding of life-sustaining
treatment obviously does not constitute assistance in sui-
cide as treatment limitation is distinct from suicide.
Conclusions
We have shown that VSED should be regarded as a
discrete form of suicide and that medical support in the
context of VSED can be equivalent to suicide assistance,
depending on the form of support and its relation to the
patient’s decision. Our analysis does not presuppose any
ethical stance towards the legitimacy of VSED and med-
ical support during VSED – both depend largely on the
ethical legitimacy of suicide and suicide assistance,
whose discussion is beyond the scope of this article [24,
25]. We do maintain, however, that future ethical discus-
sions on assisted suicide require consideration of medic-
ally supported VSED, and vice versa [26].
Thus, the widely held position by palliative care soci-
eties, professional bodies of physicians, legal scholars, and
ethicists to disapprove of assisted suicide but approve of
and even promote medically supported VSED appears in-
consistent [11, 12, 25, 27]. With the exception of one situ-
ational scenario, both end-of-life decisions should be
jointly regarded as being either ethically legitimate or il-
legitimate. From a legal perspective, those jurisdictions
that have legalized assisted suicide under certain proced-
ural requirements may need to apply the same procedural
rules to medically supported VSED. Simultaneously, all ju-
risdictions with laws prohibiting suicide assistance should
apply the same laws to medically supported VSED, intro-
duce specific legal regulations pertaining to VSED, or at
the very least clarify the legal basis for medically sup-
ported VSED. Professional societies in healthcare should
strive to harmonize their policies concerning assisted sui-
cide and medically supported VSED. Regardless of their
ethical stance, they should all promote a critical, evidence-
based and transparent discussion on this clinically and
ethically relevant issue.
Abbreviation
VSED: Voluntary stopping of eating and drinking
Acknowledgements
We thank Dorothee Wagner von Hoff for proofreading.
Funding
The work of IB and JA for this article was supported by the German Ministry
for Education and Research within the Joint Programme for
Neurodegenerative Disease Research (No. 01ED1402B). The sponsor had no
role in the theoretical analysis or the writing of the article.
Availability of data and materials
Not applicable.
Authors’ contributions
All authors equally contributed to the conceptual analysis. RJJ drafted the
text and IB, JA, and GDB revised it substantially. RJJ and IB have expertise in
medical ethics and law; RJJ, JA, and GDB have expertise in clinical medicine,
particularly in palliative care. All authors read and approved the final
manuscript.
Ethics approval and consent to participate
Not applicable.
Consent for publication
Not applicable.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Publisher’s Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in
published maps and institutional affiliations.
Author details
1Institute for Ethics, History and Theory of Medicine, University of Munich,
Lessingstr. 2, D-80336 Munich, Germany. 2Geriatric Palliative Care, University
of Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland. 3York Law School, The University of York,
York, UK. 4Palliative Care Service, Technical University Munich, Munich,
Germany. 5Service de Soins Palliatifs et de Support, Centre Hospitalier
Universitaire Vaudois, Lausanne, Switzerland.
Received: 5 May 2017 Accepted: 3 October 2017
References
1. van der Heide A, Deliens L, Faisst K, Nilstun T, Norup M, Paci E, et al. End-of-
life decision-making in six European countries: descriptive study. Lancet.
2003;362:345–50.
2. Institute of Medicine. Dying in America: improving quality and honoring
individual preferences near the end of life. Washington DC: National
Academies Press; 2014.
3. Attaran A. Unanimity on death with dignity—legalizing physician-assisted
dying in Canada. N Engl J Med. 2015;372:2080–2.
4. Mishra R. Implementing California's law on assisted dying. Hastings Cent
Rep. 2017;47:7–8.
5. Berry ZS. Responding to suffering: providing options and respecting choice.
J Pain Symptom Manage. 2009;38:797–800.
6. Bernat JL, Gert B, Mogielnicki RP. Patient refusal of hydration and nutrition.
An alternative to physician-assisted suicide or voluntary active euthanasia.
Arch Intern Med. 1993;153:2723–8.
7. Chabot BE, Goedhart A. A survey of self-directed dying attended by proxies
in the Dutch population. Soc Sci Med. 2009;68:1745–51.
8. Ganzini L, Goy ER, Miller LL, Harvath TA, Jackson A, Delorit MA. Nurses'
experiences with hospice patients who refuse food and fluids to hasten
death. N Engl J Med. 2003;349:359–65.
9. Bolt EE, Hagens M, Willems D, Onwuteaka-Philipsen BD. Primary care
patients hastening death by voluntarily stopping eating and drinking. Ann
Fam Med. 2015;13:421–8.
Jox et al. BMC Medicine  (2017) 15:186 Page 4 of 5
10. Quill TE, Byock IR. Responding to intractable terminal suffering: the role of
terminal sedation and voluntary refusal of food and fluids. ACP-ASIM End-
of-Life Care Consensus Panel. American College of Physicians-American
Society of Internal Medicine. Ann Intern Med. 2000;132:408–14.
11. Radbruch L, Leget C, Bahr P, Muller-Busch C, Ellershaw J, de Conno F, Vanden
Berghe P. Euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide: a white paper from the
European Association for Palliative Care. Palliat Med. 2016;30:104–16.
12. Radbruch L, De Lima L. International Association for Hospice and Palliative
Care response regarding voluntary cessation of food and water. J Palliat
Med. 2017;20:578–9.
13. Pope TM, West A. Legal briefing: voluntarily stopping eating and drinking. J
Clin Ethics. 2014;25:68–80.
14. Right-to-die man Tony Nicklinson dead after refusing food. BBC News. 22 Aug
2012. http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-19341722. Accessed 7 Oct 2017.
15. Simon A, Hoekstra NL. Care for patients who choose hastened death by
voluntarily stopping of eating and drinking. Dtsch Med Wochenschr. 2015;
140:1100–2.
16. Hoekstra NL, Strack M, Simon A. Physicians attitudes on voluntary refusal of
food and fluids to hasten death, results of an empirical study among 255
physicians. Z Palliativmed. 2015;16:68–73.
17. Suicide. Encyclopaedia Britannica. http://www.britannica.com/topic/suicide.
Accessed 7 Oct 2017.
18. What is suicide? Black's Law Dictionary, 2nd edition. http://thelawdictionary.
org/suicide/. Accessed 7 Oct 2017.
19. Honoré A. Causation in the Law. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
2010. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-law/. Accessed 7 Oct 2017.
20. Clarke R. Omissions: agency, metaphysics, and responsibility. Oxford: Oxford
University Press; 2014.
21. Birnbacher D. Is voluntarily stopping eating and drinking a form of suicide?
Ethik Med. 2015;27:315–24.
22. Miller M, Azrael D, Barber C. Suicide mortality in the United States: the
importance of attending to method in understanding population-level
disparities in the burden of suicide. Annu Rev Public Health. 2012;33:393–408.
23. Fewing R, Kirk TW, Meisel A. A fading decision. Hastings Cent Rep. 2014;
44(3):14.
24. Rady MY, Verheijde JL. Distress from voluntary refusal of food and fluids to
hasten death: what is the role of continuous deep sedation? J Med Ethics.
2012;38:510–2.
25. White B, Willmott L, Savulescu J. Voluntary palliated starvation: a lawful and
ethical way to die? J Law Med. 2014;22:376–86.
26. Jansen LA. Voluntary stopping of eating and drinking (VSED), physician-
assisted suicide (PAS), or neither in the last stage of life? PAS: no; VSED: it
depends. Ann Fam Med. 2015;13:410–1.
27. Quill TE, Lo B, Brock DW. Palliative options of last resort: a comparison of
voluntarily stopping eating and drinking, terminal sedation, physician-
assisted suicide, and voluntary active euthanasia. JAMA. 1997;278:2099–104.
•  We accept pre-submission inquiries 
•  Our selector tool helps you to find the most relevant journal
•  We provide round the clock customer support 
•  Convenient online submission
•  Thorough peer review
•  Inclusion in PubMed and all major indexing services 
•  Maximum visibility for your research
Submit your manuscript at
www.biomedcentral.com/submit
Submit your next manuscript to BioMed Central 
and we will help you at every step:
Jox et al. BMC Medicine  (2017) 15:186 Page 5 of 5
